Review of Economic Philosophy

Tag: Social sciences

  • The Four Analytic Levels of Social Sciences

    Abstract

    This paper argues that four analytical levels may be found in the social sciences, including economics –namely, a) a statistical descriptive level, b) a causal explanatory level, c) a teleological explicative level, and d) a prescriptive teleological level. Typically, social sciences only consider levels a) and b). The exclusion of level c) may lead to viewing behaviors that do not respect theories like the rational choice theory or the expected utility theory – theories which adopt “instrumental rationality” – as “anomalies”. Including level c) entails considering “practical rationality” and makes those anomalies reasonable. The paper adopts Aristotle’s causality notion and teleology as a theoretical framework. The first section introduces these notions, while the second section explores contemporary views on causality and teleology. The third section introduces arguments to establish the legitimacy of values in social sciences. This step is necessary because the final causes of teleological explanations in the human realm are ultimately values. These discussions pave the way for the introduction of the afore-mentioned four analytical levels in the fourth section. Specifically, in the case of economics, this discussion is based on Carl Menger’s classification of economic disciplines.

    JEL Codes: A10, A11, B3.

    [See the article on Cairn]

  • The Four Analytic Levels of Social Sciences

    Abstract

    This paper argues that four analytical levels may be found in the social sciences, including economics –namely, a) a statistical descriptive level, b) a causal explanatory level, c) a teleological explicative level, and d) a prescriptive teleological level. Typically, social sciences only consider levels a) and b). The exclusion of level c) may lead to viewing behaviors that do not respect theories like the rational choice theory or the expected utility theory – theories which adopt “instrumental rationality” – as “anomalies”. Including level c) entails considering “practical rationality” and makes those anomalies reasonable. The paper adopts Aristotle’s causality notion and teleology as a theoretical framework. The first section introduces these notions, while the second section explores contemporary views on causality and teleology. The third section introduces arguments to establish the legitimacy of values in social sciences. This step is necessary because the final causes of teleological explanations in the human realm are ultimately values. These discussions pave the way for the introduction of the afore-mentioned four analytical levels in the fourth section. Specifically, in the case of economics, this discussion is based on Carl Menger’s classification of economic disciplines.

    Outline

    • 1. Aristotle’s views on causality and explanation
    • 2. Causality and teleology today
    • 3. Science and values
      1. 3.1. Arguments denying the distinction between fact and value
      2. 3.2. Arguments from under-determination
      3. 3.3. Arguments from the social processes of science
    • 4. Analysis levels in economics

    Keywords

    , , , ,

    JEL Codes : A10, A11, B3

    [Read the article in Cairn]

  • God, Providence, and the Future of the Social Sciences

    Abstract

    There is a systematic and unquestioning tendency, observable in the social sciences, and especially of late in economics (Lawson 1997; Fullbrook 2004), toward considering formal models as superior, as somehow more scientific than other non-formal methods. There is a further resulting tendency for other social sciences to emulate economics’ methodological orientation. My concern here is manifold. First, to the extent that the alleged superiority of formalism results in an anti-pluralistic methodological orientation, intellectual progress is being thwarted. Second, in so far as the specific methodology is spreading across the social sciences, the phenomenon merits added attention. Third, questions of methodology, though central to good scientific inquiry, are too often relegated to “lofty” philosophers of science. I take the opportunity to reaffirm their relevance. I explore possible problems with formalism in the social sciences, particularly as formulated by the Critical Realist and/or Cambridge School. My hope is that social scientists may increasingly see that their plight is not isolated and discipline-specific, but is resolutely an increasing interdisciplinary phenomenon. Finally, I hope to encourage the social scientific community to (re-)engage in methodological reflexivity and to produce a united effort to protect intellectual freedom as a condition for scientific progress.

    Keywords

    , , , ,