Tag: Education

  • Aristotle on Some Political Limitations to Economic Concerns

    Abstract

    In the Politics, Aristotle is committed to distinguishing the economic sphere and the political sphere in order to articulate and prioritize them. While recognizing the specific autonomy of economic activities, the Stagirite exposes the reasons that legitimize the limitation of these activities by the political power. By consecrating the eminence of politics in relation to the commercial sphere Aristotle manifests the imperious need to subordinate the search for an acquisition of material goods – legitimate in its order – to the highest activities of man which alone are likely to bring him true happiness. Sought for themselves, these are the expression of an exit by man from a logic of utility and testify to an authentic form of freedom in which his virtue and his excellence are deployed. It is ultimately only an education in the life of leisure that brings into the community individuals able to assume the moral and political destination the city is called to.

    Keywords

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  • Cheap Preferences and Intergenerational Justice

    Abstract

    This paper focuses on a specific challenge for welfarist theories of intergenerational justice. Subjective welfarism permits and even requires that a generation, G1, inculcates cheap preferences in the next generation, G2. This would allow G1 to deplete resources instead of saving them, which seems to contradict the ideal of sustainability. The aim of the paper is to show that, even if subjective welfarism requires the cultivation of cheap preferences among future generations, it can accommodate two major objections to cheap preferences engineering, the Autonomy Objection and the Fairness Objection. The paper argues that teaching autonomy-related abilities is compatible with cheap preferences engineering insofar as autonomy is understood as an end-state and not as a precondition. Furthermore, teaching autonomy-related abilities could even be required in order to improve G2’s prospects for well-being. However, since being autonomous renders G2 able to revise their initially cheap preferences, G1 should also save enough resources to enable members of G2 to do so. Therefore, cultivating cheap preferences among G2 does not allow G1 to deplete the available resources.

    Outline

    1. Introduction
    2. Equal prospects for well-being for future generations
    3. The prudential argument for cheap preferences engineering
    4. Three objections to cheap preferences engineering: the Objective Good Objection, the Autonomy Objection and the Fairness Objection
    5. Distributive implications
    6. Conclusion

    Keywords

    Classification JEL : D60, I31.


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