Tag: Philosophy of science

  • Controversies around Neuroeconomics: Empirical, Methodological and Philosophical Issues

    Abstract

    By the late 1990s, several converging trends in economics, psychology, and neuroscience had set the stage for the birth of a new scientific field known as “neuroeconomics”. As with any emerging discipline – consider for example mathematical economics, econometrics or experimental economics at different times – neuroeconomics is rather controversial with economists. It raises a large number of empirical, methodological and philosophical questions resulting in debates and controversies that this article reviews and discusses by addressing three major issues concerning the contribution made so far to knowledge: Is it reliable? Is it scientifically legitimate? Is it useful for economists? Without claiming to be exhaustive, this analytical framework enables understanding of the thrust of the major criticisms of neuroeconomics. At the same time, the paper sheds light on the nature of the responses likely to be provided in view of the conceptual and empirical progresses made in the field since its emergence and considering the turn identified in the agenda of neuroeconomics over the last decade.

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    [See the article in Cairn]

  • Methodological Principles and Experimental Economy Practices: An Overview

    Abstract

    The paper discusses the basis of the experimental method in general, its adaptation to the study of economic phenomena, and the recent philosophical thoughts on the nature of laboratory experiments. It also inventories the main experimental procedures that characterize best practices of economists—some of them quite ingenious—by drawing a parallel with what distinguishes them from former practices established by psychologists. In particular, the issue of monetary incentives is carefully examined. The paper emphasizes the immense progress that has been accomplished in a few decades while taking into account the disagreements that still persist between some experimentalists and the ongoing existence of some important “open” questions. In this regard, the paper tries to clarify a major methodological questioning which only recently has been approached more seriously: the issue of “external validity” of experimental results (i.e., their “generalizability” to the outside world).

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