While the dialogue between Rawls and Sen initially involved cooperation to move beyond utilitarianism and better understand social justice, it gradually became more strained due to increasingly acknowledged fundamental differences on Sen’s part. Sen ultimately arrived at a project quite different from a theory of justice, though this shift has not always been fully understood. The aim of this article is to clarify this alternative project, while also showing the richness of their dialogue, which, despite seeming less cooperative, remains productive. Unlike Rawls, Sen starts from a non-ideal conception of persons and constructs his approach to justice in a way that develops their agency alongside their impartiality. The shift introduced by Sen offers an expanded framework for public action, one that is not limited to actions within institutions but also includes what the “public” can do as an actor or activator of social transformations. The normative approach to agency that we present, in our view, is the major outcome of Sen’s philosophical work in his contribution to democratic approaches to justice. It has also resonated in the evolution of Rawls’ own work