Abstract
Dissenting in Sierra Club v. Morton in 1972, Justice Douglas surprised the American Supreme Court asserting that legal standing should be allowed “in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers” [405 U.S. 74]. Inspired by Christopher Stone’s article published few weeks earlier (“Should trees have standing?”), Justice Douglas pointed out the defective protection of non-human entities, due to their lack of representation in courtrooms. In fact, his argument highlighted a latent confusion surrounding the concept of interest which hinders, not only the development of non-humans and collectivities’rights, but also legal litigations on their behalf. The Supreme Court dismissed the Sierra Club’s claim arguing that natural resources of the Sequoia National Forest were not regarded as legally protected interests, whereas the non-profit organization lacked personal interest in the case.
In this case, the interest is evoked both in its substantive and in its procedural dimension. It is thus in terms of interests that this case addresses the question of justice towards non-human and collective entities. Interest and justice have not always been so closely linked. For a long time, they have been opposed, starting with Diderot and d’Alembert who, in their Encyclopedia, define the interest as “that which makes us seek our advantages in disregard for justice and virtue, and it is a vile ambition” (Diderot et D’Alembert 1777, 917). The satisfaction of interests would therefore be antinomic with the pursuit of justice…