Abstract The solutions of the old problems of bankruptcy, rights arbitration, and contested garment were given in the Talmud without any justification. A paper published in the journal Synthese (Guiasu 2011) showed that these solutions may be obtained using the Shapley value from the n-person game theory if the characteristic functions of the games corresponding to … Continue reading Three Wives Problem and Shapley Value. Answer to Professor De Mesnard’s Criticism
Tag: Shapley value
The three wives problem and Shapley value
Abstract We examine the Talmudic three wives problem, which is a generalization of the Talmudic contested garment problem solved by Aumann and Maschler (1985) using coalitional procedure. This problem has many practical applications. In an attempt to unify all Talmudic methods, Guiasu (2010, 2011) asserts that it can be explained in terms of “run-to-the-bank”, that … Continue reading The three wives problem and Shapley value