Table of Contents
Abstract
The solutions of the old problems of bankruptcy, rights arbitration, and contested garment were given in the Talmud without any justification. A paper published in the journal Synthese (Guiasu 2011) showed that these solutions may be obtained using the Shapley value from the n-person game theory if the characteristic functions of the games corresponding to these three problems essentially depend on the respective context. Three years later, a criticism of the paper from Synthese was posted on the internet (De Mesnard 2014). Here is the answer to this criticism.
Classification JEL : B11, B16, C02, C71
Outline
- Introduction
- Solving the Talmudic problems of bankruptcy and contested garment using the Shapley value
- Solution of the bankruptcy problem
- Solution of the contested garment problem
- Answer to Professor De Mesnard’s criticism
- Conclusion
Keywords
- bankruptcy
- rights arbitration
- contested garment
- maximal or cumulative n-person games
- Shapley value