In this paper we expose a new conception of ideology which is different from the sociological one, notably the one developped by Marx. As we know, Marx’s conception has several limits. The principal one is generally referred to as the Mannheim paradox. To avoid this difficulty, we propose a new conception of ideology based on cognitive specification of knowledge which distinguishes the major forms of learned discourse : the scientific, the philosophic and the ideological ones. These cognitive strategies of knowledge are called the pure forms of thought. The two main caracteristics of the ideological pure forms of thought are the followings : the first one is that the belief is (psycho)logically primary, its justification opportune ; the second one explicits an ontological principle deciding the essential articulation between two separate entities, man and society. This new approach of ideology allows us not only to forget about the Mannheim Paradox, but also to treat different applications in economic literature.
Tag: liberty
Quelques souvenirs de John Rawls
These lines briefly relate the scientific part of nearly fourty years of discussions with John Rawls. Their interest – if they have any – can rest in three contributions. First, this relation shows the genesis of John Rawls’ concepts and thought. Second, it implies a criticism of these concepts and shows how Rawls faced it. Finally, this desciption exhibits an essential feature of the history of polical philosophy, the idiosyncrasis of English-language thinking in this domain, in opposition to the rest of the world and in particular to the thought developed in France. Indeed, utilitarianism has only been the philosophy of English-language scholars. Rawls first is the philosopher who will have tried to put English-language political philosophy on the path of normality based on liberty and equality after two centuries of Benthamite dogmatism.
L’hétérogénéïté des mécanismes spontanés et ses implications pour la lecture de Hayek
According to Friedrich Hayek, conformity to the rule of law guarantees the existence of a free society, that is of a society governed by law and not by men. The aim of this paper is first to clarify the interpretation of the rule of law that is likely to sustain such a claim and second, to determine how far such an interpretation could allow for the criteria –specially the economic criteria — used by Hayek himself to ascertain the acceptability of laws. My conclusion is that the use of some of these criteria does conflict with a systematic conception of law and that far from confirming the determinant role of the rule of law, it rather allows for the arbitrariness of those who make laws.
La loi de la liberté
According to Friedrich Hayek, conformity to the rule of law guarantees the existence of a free society, that is of a society governed by law and not by men. The aim of this paper is first to clarify the interpretation of the rule of law that is likely to sustain such a claim and second, to determine how far such an interpretation could allow for the criterian — specially the economic criteria — used by Hayek himself to ascertain the acceptability of laws. My conclusion is that the use of some of these criteria does conflict with a systematic conception of law and that far from confirming the determinant role of the rule of law, it rather allows for the arbitrariness of those who make laws.
Quesnay’s Liberty and Rationality
The thought of Quesnay and Physiocrats is ambivalent: on the one hand, it promotes free trade, on the other it develops a political doctrine based on despotism. Would there be a discontinuity of physiocratic thought where the economy is the only space of freedom? For Quesnay, liberty is not absence of constraints; it is an opportunity for calculation and the expression of rationality. It analyzes the origins of this concept through Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz and Locke. The relation between liberty and natural right is analyzed to understand the coherence of physiocratic thought. Thus we understand better the link between liberty and order.
A Theory of Real Freedom: Toward a Growth-Oriented Liberalism
What is the nature of real (substantive) freedom in our society? Here, I shall present a new theory of liberalism which I call “growth-oriented liberalism.” First, I examine Isaiah Berlin’s concept of positive and negative freedom and raise a fundamental problem regarding freedom: Freedom is a paradoxical ideal. I shall identify two paradoxes: one concerns ordinary freedom and sophisticated values, and the other bears on “liberation” and the apathy of individuals or of groups. How can we overcome these paradoxes? To respond to this question, I shall examine Charles Taylor’s argument on positive liberty (freedom) and extend its implications. The issue is all the deeper as a society is closely knitted as a community, which is a typical trait told about Japan. By going beyond Taylor’s communitarian way of thinking, I shall endeavor to build a new theory of freedom by proposing three principles: the principle of virtue (self-esteem), the principle of generative change, and the principle of differentiation. I argue that the touchstone of free society depends on how we design our social governance based on these principles.