In this paper we expose a new conception of ideology which is different from the sociological one, notably the one developped by Marx. As we know, Marx’s conception has several limits. The principal one is generally referred to as the Mannheim paradox. To avoid this difficulty, we propose a new conception of ideology based on cognitive specification of knowledge which distinguishes the major forms of learned discourse : the scientific, the philosophic and the ideological ones. These cognitive strategies of knowledge are called the pure forms of thought. The two main caracteristics of the ideological pure forms of thought are the followings : the first one is that the belief is (psycho)logically primary, its justification opportune ; the second one explicits an ontological principle deciding the essential articulation between two separate entities, man and society. This new approach of ideology allows us not only to forget about the Mannheim Paradox, but also to treat different applications in economic literature.
Hayek’s ideas in economics and social philosophy are weel known and have already been thoroughly explored, but his ideas in epistemology and methodology have not. In particular, what Hayek calls ” antiphysicalism ” in social sciences needs much more analysis if we are to understand why Hayek states that economics cannot and should not be regarded as a ” social physics “. I will precisely analyse this thesis putting to work all of Hayek’s writings dealing with epistemological and methodological queries, and especially in reference to his work in neuropsychology (The Sensory Order, 1952). I will systematically reconstruct Hayek’s economic methodology and show that, as a whole, it is a genuine inference, the first premisse being based on a ” theory of economic knowledge “, the second one on a ” constructivist ontology of social reality “, and the conclusive argument being methodological dualism-but, perhaps surprisingly, a weak one.
About social justice, Hayek’s position gives rise to ambivalent remarks : on one hand, as a by-product of evolutionist thought process, his conclusions are coherent and realistic and it is hard to catch him out ; on the other hand, strong liberal convictions induce Hayek to choose provocative words. Concerning the “mirage of social justice”, we try to show in the paper that Hayek’standpoint is less radical than at the first sight. To begin with, abstract rules of just conduct are quite impartial and express a real conception of justice in society ; moreover, Hayek supports a form of minimum income so as to reduce the risk of market, but this goal could be more easily reached by application of a real basic income.
According to Friedrich Hayek, conformity to the rule of law guarantees the existence of a free society, that is of a society governed by law and not by men. The aim of this paper is first to clarify the interpretation of the rule of law that is likely to sustain such a claim and second, to determine how far such an interpretation could allow for the criterian — specially the economic criteria — used by Hayek himself to ascertain the acceptability of laws. My conclusion is that the use of some of these criteria does conflict with a systematic conception of law and that far from confirming the determinant role of the rule of law, it rather allows for the arbitrariness of those who make laws.
Hayek’s references to Hume and Kant helps him to locate his liberalism and anti-constructivism above the simple level of sociology. But Darwin’s naturalism and the notion of spontaneous order hinder him from being inspired by their philosophy of history. In other words, Hayek’s references can only be understood by interpreting Kant in Hume’s Line, Hume in Darwin’s Line –but Darwin’s naturalism prevents from understanding Hume’s & Kant’s philosophy of history and contradicts Hayek’s promissing philosophy of economic action.
This paper upholds the thesis that contemporary modelling of complex cognitive, economic, and social systems vindicates Hayek’s conception of modernity and justifies the apparent conservatism of his liberalism. It changes so drastically our conception of rationality that it allows us to overcome Hayek’s criticism of rational constructivism and to work out a new form of critical rationalism. It is now possible to speak of an Hayekian Enlightenment and to conceive of his liberalism as a new Aufklärung.
The modernization of Japan has been taking place since the last half of the nineteenth century: paradoxically enough, elements of Japan’s geography and culture may explain this evolution. Even though very few Japanese economists would call themselves “liberal,” Hayek’s writings had a large audience. The heir to the Austrian school of economic thought, who was pro-free trade and a supporter of individual liberties has been fully translated (twice in fact, see references of Complete Works, at the end of this essay) thus illustrating his influence in academia, public service, and politics (on economic policies). Hayek anchored his views in those of the early Marginalist Austrian founder Menger (1840-1921), whose archives are also to be found in Japan. The encounter of Austrian thought and the far-away land may create a stir. In order to understand the extraordinary impact that the thought of Friedrich Hayek had, philosophical and epistemological traits are examined in this paper, along with attempts to make sense of this striking occurrence.
This paper studies the critique of Friedrich Hayek’s liberalism delivered by Raymond Aron, on a period that runs from the 1940s to the early 1980s. Through a cross rereading of the main texts of these two twentieth century philosophers, it tries to show that their oppositions—on the place of economic freedom, on the definition of freedom, and on the conception of democracy—reveal the existence of two deeply divergent paths within contemporary neo-liberalism: one that is based on an obsessive attachment to the market and that is accompanied by a pronounced distrust towards democracy; the other that is, on the contrary, built on a trust in democracy, considered as liberalism’s endpoint, which leads to the non- absolutization of the market. Reconsidering this opposition may facilitate a process of moving away from a narrow and caricatural perception of neo-liberalism, which reduces it to a locking of political possibilities.